From the start, it was evident that Russia΄s Syrian campaign had caused a serious side effect of heavy cogniive dissonance to a great part of the mainstream media and their pundits
Is Russia West's brightest pupil?
From the start, it was evident that Russia's Syrian campaign had caused a serious side effect of heavy cognitive dissonance to a great part of the mainstream media and their pundits. At the beginning of the airstrikes, a whole lot of very new, new and old media outlets were vociferous about the hopelessness of the Russian intervention, calling it “a logical contradiction!”, “doomed to fail”, “ISIS's accomodation” that help it expand. After just one month, the failure of the Russian strategy was confidently declared. Again and again. Russia was going to be sucked in a quagmire, a failure. The Daily Telegraph went as far as to try and spin a Russian MoD statement that stated a change in the number of airstrikes. as a failure acknowledgment Suddenly a few weeks later, in a complete change of course, the fact that the “doomed” Russian air-strikes created a new reality on the Syrian ground, became widely acceptable. And not long after that, in Monday, that same campaign was wrapped-up- it's objectives declared “generally accomplished” by Russia's president Vladimir Putin- forcing the same cognitive dissonance in the media to resurface and, as it reached its apex, giving birth to many questions. I will try to answer most of them, but let me begin by pointing out that I do not comprehend a lot of the bickering over the Russian strategy, as it is crystal clear in its motives and most of all in its evolution. The Russian Federation, while a failed, disorganized, and weak state during most of the 90's, has clearly studied and expanded on the most successful aspects of NATO foreign strategy.
Learn and expand
The first lesson is that the days of the cautious Soviet Union -in a dodgy relationship with its allies (who remembers that the Soviets handed over the membership lists of the whole Egyptian Communist Party to Nasser’s secret police as part of a weapons-trading deal in the early 1960s? Let me see some hands..), are long gone. Like the US, the Russians are learning to stick to their allies, after they have almost bled to death, propping them up, however dismal they might be.
Second lesson: close air-support (CAS), matters. After Yugoslavia and Libya, two wars that effectively would not have been victorious for the West without an effective air-umbrella, the Russian brass came to a profound understanding that if they wanted to maintain a sphere of influence abroad, they had to thwart “no-fly zones” and provide their own.
The third and most important lesson is that the Russia Federation has been able to learn from mistakes, thus becoming able to expand. It loathes committing large numbers of ground troops abroad with the possibility of them to be sucked in a doomed and costly counter-insurgency operation, avoids going for a “total” victory when there is no immediate chance of that happening, hedges its bets and keeps its options and exit strategy open, while setting achievable and pragmatic goals. When is the last time the USA did that? In that sense, Russia is the West's brightest pupil. Let's see how all these played out in Syria.
Mission accomplished? What mission?
All in all, Russia's strategic goals in Syria were limited. The Russians went in with a small force and achieved limited goals. As Vladimir Putin himself declared in an interview with Vladimir Soloviev on the TV channel Russia 1, “our objective is to stabilize the legitimate authority and create conditions for a political compromise”. The Russian mission has achieved its primary military goal, the creation of safe haven and a viable statelet on the Syrian coastal area for its client, with the Nusayriyah mountain range as a buffer zone, and security for its 2 Mediterranean bases. It is true that it is not a “total victory”, since thousand of armed groups, ISIS, Al-Nusra et. al are on the ground, and the Syrian Arab Army cannot defeat them, but it cannot be defeated either. Militias are forces with low offensive power, the SAA is battle hardened and it's supported by the best infantry in the Middle East (Hezbollah). Additionally an elaborate Shia recruiting network, managed by Iran, brings into Syria even Afganistan's Shia Hazaras.
In addition, and equally importantly, it also achieved its primary diplomatic goal in making the precondition previously set out by the various opposition groups that before any meaningful negotiations could start, “Assad must go”, null and void. Russia's withdrawal puts pressure on Assad, as well as Iran, to seriously commit to a political transition and leave aside any thoughts of “recapturing the whole of Syria”. In that point, a possible Iranian-Russian fault line over Syria can be seen. According to recent reports, Iran is increasing it forces on the ground. Turkey, along with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, now find themselves in an awkward spot, as almost any initiative they could undertake would be perceived as an act of covert aggression and disturbance of the peace process. All the while, the Kurds are coyly advancing in NE Syria, bickering between themselves, and they seem to be the only party to openly and honestly acknowledge the fact that Syria is de-facto partitioned. As for the US, it is possible that this deal includes them, especially since the un-reported remark from John Kerry about a week ago in Israel, that “even Russians have seen the light”, and Russia's FM S. Lavrov's hectic program the previous weeks. In any case, given the high partisanship of American politics, we should expect some serious Washington-Virginia grumbling, while the US struggles to counter ISIS in Iraq. We should not also forget that ISIS is an Iraqi phenomenon, and Syria is just a franchise. Israel it fears one thing: Hezbollah. The various Sunni militias are not considered to be a threat. But chaos is not a strategy that can be pursued for long.
A gamble among gambles
According to Putin, the interested parties – mainly the U.S. – will put the heat on those they can influence in order to make the cessation of hostilities stick, and cooperate in thwarting the aims and actions of ISIS and Al Qaeda. A dangerous gamble, since in recent years it has been proven that the Saudis, Qataris and Turks are difficult partners. A re-escalation of hostilities remains possible along with a derailment of the diplomatic effort. It is not easy to achieve consensus, let alone elections, in a de-facto partitioned state flooded with arms. For that exact reason, Russia's wording is revealing. In Russian military terminology “generally accomplished” is roughly equivalent to good-but-not-excellent since the initial goals have not been fully reached. Military hardware, advisers and intelligence will continue to flow towards Assad. The Russian bases are still there. Putin’s decision of partial withdrawal from Syria coincided with the regular rotation of the aircraft involved in the Russian operation in Syria. The Russian Aerospace Forces rotate aircraft at the Hmeymim airbase regularly due to the high number of combat sorties they undertake. Russia also holds the initiative in the diplomatic field. This fact is confirmed by US Secretary of State John Kerry’s decision to visit Russia next week to discuss the Syria crisis. Putin is keeping his options open, in view of the fact that the major part of the internal opposition, a formidable enemy, blames him that he has not done enough in the “self-defeating” Minsk accords concerning Ukraine. In Russia, the discussion between Putin, FM Lavrov and Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu, during which V. Putin ordered the withdrawal, was conceived as a public relations disaster. The Russian president is now on damage control mode.
For the time being, one should follow the Geneva talks while keeping an eye on Syria. Hezbollah has mobilized more soldiers to help liberate the strategic desert city of Palmyra (Tadmur). During the preliminary assault on the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham’s (ISIS) defenses, it had only contributed with a small contingent. Syria is still a battlefield, albeit a low-intensity one.
From the start, it was evident that Russia's Syrian campaign had caused a serious side effect of heavy cognitive dissonance to a great part of the mainstream media and their pundits. At the beginning of the airstrikes, a whole lot of very new, new and old media outlets were vociferous about the hopelessness of the Russian intervention, calling it “a logical contradiction!”, “doomed to fail”, “ISIS's accomodation” that help it expand. After just one month, the failure of the Russian strategy was confidently declared. Again and again. Russia was going to be sucked in a quagmire, a failure. The Daily Telegraph went as far as to try and spin a Russian MoD statement that stated a change in the number of airstrikes. as a failure acknowledgment Suddenly a few weeks later, in a complete change of course, the fact that the “doomed” Russian air-strikes created a new reality on the Syrian ground, became widely acceptable. And not long after that, in Monday, that same campaign was wrapped-up- it's objectives declared “generally accomplished” by Russia's president Vladimir Putin- forcing the same cognitive dissonance in the media to resurface and, as it reached its apex, giving birth to many questions. I will try to answer most of them, but let me begin by pointing out that I do not comprehend a lot of the bickering over the Russian strategy, as it is crystal clear in its motives and most of all in its evolution. The Russian Federation, while a failed, disorganized, and weak state during most of the 90's, has clearly studied and expanded on the most successful aspects of NATO foreign strategy.
Learn and expand
The first lesson is that the days of the cautious Soviet Union -in a dodgy relationship with its allies (who remembers that the Soviets handed over the membership lists of the whole Egyptian Communist Party to Nasser’s secret police as part of a weapons-trading deal in the early 1960s? Let me see some hands..), are long gone. Like the US, the Russians are learning to stick to their allies, after they have almost bled to death, propping them up, however dismal they might be.
Second lesson: close air-support (CAS), matters. After Yugoslavia and Libya, two wars that effectively would not have been victorious for the West without an effective air-umbrella, the Russian brass came to a profound understanding that if they wanted to maintain a sphere of influence abroad, they had to thwart “no-fly zones” and provide their own.
The third and most important lesson is that the Russia Federation has been able to learn from mistakes, thus becoming able to expand. It loathes committing large numbers of ground troops abroad with the possibility of them to be sucked in a doomed and costly counter-insurgency operation, avoids going for a “total” victory when there is no immediate chance of that happening, hedges its bets and keeps its options and exit strategy open, while setting achievable and pragmatic goals. When is the last time the USA did that? In that sense, Russia is the West's brightest pupil. Let's see how all these played out in Syria.
Mission accomplished? What mission?
All in all, Russia's strategic goals in Syria were limited. The Russians went in with a small force and achieved limited goals. As Vladimir Putin himself declared in an interview with Vladimir Soloviev on the TV channel Russia 1, “our objective is to stabilize the legitimate authority and create conditions for a political compromise”. The Russian mission has achieved its primary military goal, the creation of safe haven and a viable statelet on the Syrian coastal area for its client, with the Nusayriyah mountain range as a buffer zone, and security for its 2 Mediterranean bases. It is true that it is not a “total victory”, since thousand of armed groups, ISIS, Al-Nusra et. al are on the ground, and the Syrian Arab Army cannot defeat them, but it cannot be defeated either. Militias are forces with low offensive power, the SAA is battle hardened and it's supported by the best infantry in the Middle East (Hezbollah). Additionally an elaborate Shia recruiting network, managed by Iran, brings into Syria even Afganistan's Shia Hazaras.
In addition, and equally importantly, it also achieved its primary diplomatic goal in making the precondition previously set out by the various opposition groups that before any meaningful negotiations could start, “Assad must go”, null and void. Russia's withdrawal puts pressure on Assad, as well as Iran, to seriously commit to a political transition and leave aside any thoughts of “recapturing the whole of Syria”. In that point, a possible Iranian-Russian fault line over Syria can be seen. According to recent reports, Iran is increasing it forces on the ground. Turkey, along with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, now find themselves in an awkward spot, as almost any initiative they could undertake would be perceived as an act of covert aggression and disturbance of the peace process. All the while, the Kurds are coyly advancing in NE Syria, bickering between themselves, and they seem to be the only party to openly and honestly acknowledge the fact that Syria is de-facto partitioned. As for the US, it is possible that this deal includes them, especially since the un-reported remark from John Kerry about a week ago in Israel, that “even Russians have seen the light”, and Russia's FM S. Lavrov's hectic program the previous weeks. In any case, given the high partisanship of American politics, we should expect some serious Washington-Virginia grumbling, while the US struggles to counter ISIS in Iraq. We should not also forget that ISIS is an Iraqi phenomenon, and Syria is just a franchise. Israel it fears one thing: Hezbollah. The various Sunni militias are not considered to be a threat. But chaos is not a strategy that can be pursued for long.
A gamble among gambles
According to Putin, the interested parties – mainly the U.S. – will put the heat on those they can influence in order to make the cessation of hostilities stick, and cooperate in thwarting the aims and actions of ISIS and Al Qaeda. A dangerous gamble, since in recent years it has been proven that the Saudis, Qataris and Turks are difficult partners. A re-escalation of hostilities remains possible along with a derailment of the diplomatic effort. It is not easy to achieve consensus, let alone elections, in a de-facto partitioned state flooded with arms. For that exact reason, Russia's wording is revealing. In Russian military terminology “generally accomplished” is roughly equivalent to good-but-not-excellent since the initial goals have not been fully reached. Military hardware, advisers and intelligence will continue to flow towards Assad. The Russian bases are still there. Putin’s decision of partial withdrawal from Syria coincided with the regular rotation of the aircraft involved in the Russian operation in Syria. The Russian Aerospace Forces rotate aircraft at the Hmeymim airbase regularly due to the high number of combat sorties they undertake. Russia also holds the initiative in the diplomatic field. This fact is confirmed by US Secretary of State John Kerry’s decision to visit Russia next week to discuss the Syria crisis. Putin is keeping his options open, in view of the fact that the major part of the internal opposition, a formidable enemy, blames him that he has not done enough in the “self-defeating” Minsk accords concerning Ukraine. In Russia, the discussion between Putin, FM Lavrov and Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu, during which V. Putin ordered the withdrawal, was conceived as a public relations disaster. The Russian president is now on damage control mode.
For the time being, one should follow the Geneva talks while keeping an eye on Syria. Hezbollah has mobilized more soldiers to help liberate the strategic desert city of Palmyra (Tadmur). During the preliminary assault on the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham’s (ISIS) defenses, it had only contributed with a small contingent. Syria is still a battlefield, albeit a low-intensity one.